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[Reference is] a theoretical construct, whose function is exhausted in stating
the truth-conditions for sentences (Davidson, 1977, p.223)1
Reference leads a strange double life in Donald Davidson’s philosophy of language. On
the one hand, it is at the heart of his account of the meaning of words and the
learnability of language. On the other, he is concerned to combat overly ‘realist’ views
about the relation. And he explicitly endorses the seemingly incredible position that
reference is wildly inscrutable. There is no fact of the matter at all about what our
words refer to.
Section 1 reviews the role of reference within Davidson’s T-theoretic account of language.
Section 2 examines the case for the inscrutability of reference based on Davidson’s
account of radical interpretation. Section 3 concerns the explanatory role of reference,
which we cover in two parts: the ﬁrst concerning explanations that directly appeal to
reference; the second concerning explanations that appeal to beliefs about reference.
1 Reference in T-theories.
1.1 Fitting an inﬁnite capacity in a ﬁnite head.
Each one of us is in a position to understand inﬁnitely many, never-before-encountered
sentences of our language. How, even in principle, could a ﬁnite being manage to
acquire such an inﬁnite capacity?2
Suppose that the inﬁnitely-many sentences have a very simple vocabulary and syntax.
There are one name “Asa”, one (monadic) predicates “runs”, and the sentential
connectives “not: ...” and “...and...”. They combine into grammatical sentences just as
you would expect. This generates inﬁnitely many sentences, e.g.:
• Asa runs
1All page references to articles by Davidson will be to the collected editions (Davidson, 1984)
2(Davidson, 1965, 1967)
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• Not: Asa runs
• (Asa runs and Not: Asa runs).
• Not: (Asa runs and Not: Asa runs).
• …
A T-biconditional links the truth of any one of these object-language sentences to a way
the world might be. For example:
• “Asa runs” is true iﬀ Asa runs.
• “Not: Asa runs” is true iﬀ Asa doesn’t run.
• “(Asa runs and Not: Asa runs)” is true iﬀ Asa runs and Asa doesn’t run.
• “Not: (Asa runs and Not: Asa runs)” is true iﬀ
it’s not the case that Asa runs and Asa doesn’t run.
• …
Users of the language are in a position to pick out biconditionals of this form for each
sentence they understand. This itself is an inﬁnitary capacity, and surely not
unconnected to the inﬁnite capacity to understand the sentences (we’ll look at what the
relation is further in §3.2). Let’s see how a ﬁnite creature might in principle get into a
position to know all these biconditionals.
The obvious solution is for the creature to have a small range of core information from
which the whole range of claims we’ve identiﬁed may be derived—plus the ability to
derive any given claim on the list when prompted. This is the job description for
Davidson’s T-theories. The core information are the axioms of the T-theory; and it is
here that the notion of reference is introduced. A sample T-theory for our toy language
might be:3
1. “Asa” refers to Asa.
2. For any name N, “N runs” is true iﬀ the referent of N runs.
3. For any sentence S, “Not: S” is true iﬀ S is not true
4. For any sentences, S, T, “(S and T)” is true iﬀ S is true and T is true.
Someone who knew these axioms, with minimal reasoning, could work out each
T-biconditional on our earlier list; and inﬁnitely many more besides. Nor would they
need creativity in ﬁguring out how the derivation should go. There is a canonical
method, depending only on the syntax of the sentence in question, for deriving the
3I follow (Lepore & Ludwig, 2005) in the construction of this toy T-theory.
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corresponding T-biconditional. A derivation from the axioms of a T-biconditional that
implements this method will be called a canonical derivation and the T-biconditional
that results the canonical T-biconditional for S of the T-theory in question.4
We have seen one way of accounting for our (inﬁnite) capacity to know each of the
T-biconditionals on the list in question, by storing a small range of information and
draw out their consequences. Davidson (1965) claims that in setting out this T-theory,
we have also answered the original question of explaining how in principle we could
acquire the inﬁnite capacity to understand all the sentences—for he claims that learning
the T-theory (or perhaps: learning the T-theory and that it is a T-theory; or learning
the T-theory and knowing that it is a T-theory adequate by the lights of radical
interpretation) suﬃces for understanding.
At the heart of Davidson’s explanation of the learnability of language, then, are
T-theories. And at the heart of T-theories lies reference.
1.2 Conditions under which reference is required.
Our toy language is extraordinarily simple, and natural languages are extraordinarily
complex. Whether a Davidsonian T-theory can be constructed for natural language and
if so, what shape it will ﬁnally take, is a major empirical issue.5 This matters! Perhaps
it will turn out that for English, reference is not the key notion in generating a
T-theory; perhaps a speciﬁcation of the intension of a name rather than its reference will
be required; perhaps we will ﬁnd a need for reference relations for expressions in other
syntactic categories.6 However, I’ll work here under the assumption that reference
remains at the heart of a T-theory for natural language as well as toy examples.
It is illuminating to study in very simple cases the conditions under which to answer the
learnability question we require a referential axiomatization (or more generally, an
axiomatization that attributes semantic properties to subsentential expressions). The
toy language given above is so simple, that appeal to reference doesn’t seem mandatory
to explain an ability to derive each T-biconditional. For example, we could replace (1)
and (2) above with the single axiom
(1+2) “Asa runs” is true iﬀ Asa runs.
This would bring both quantitative and qualitative parsimony to the theory.
Quantitatively, we switch two axioms for one of comparable complexity. Qualitatively,
we eliminate appeal to any relation other than truth from our theory. From this
4For canonical derivations, see, inter alia, (Davies, 1981; Kölbel, 2001; Lepore & Ludwig, 2005)
5See for example (Larson & Segal, 1995; Lepore & Ludwig, 2007).
6The semantic theory presented in the inﬂuential textbook (Heim & Kratzer, 1998) is an interesting
point of comparison and contrast, since, like Davidson (and unlike e.g. (Lewis, 1970), it emphasises
the derivation of (something close to) T-sentences, but works from the start with semantic values for
expressions of all types, and ultimately introduces intensions.
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perspective, appeal to reference to explain the in-principle learnability of the language is
otiose, and rather unmotivated.
As we add more names and predicates into our toy language, however, the two kinds of
economy work against each other. With ten names, and ten monadic predicates there
will be one hundred atomic sentences in the toy language (“Asa runs”, “Asa walks”,
“Beth runs”,…). Finitely axiomatizing the T-theory in our later “truth-only” style, via a
T-biconditional for each atomic sentence, plus the recursive axioms, would require 102
axioms—one for each atomic sentence, plus the recursive clauses for connectives labelled
(3) and (4) above. If we stuck with the approach of our original toy theory, with an
axiom stating the referent of each name (plus an appropriate axiom for each predicate)
we require only 20 axioms plus the axioms for the connectives.
There is a kind of structure to the knowledge obtained via learning the 22 lexical
axioms.7 If our agent forgets one piece of the basic information—for example, she
forgets what “Asa” refers to—then she loses the ability to derive T-biconditionals for the
ten atomic sentences in which “Asa” ﬁgures. Conversely, if she learns the referent of a
new name, she is immediately in the position to understand ten new atomic sentences.
An understanding obtained through learned a separate piece of information for each
atomic sentence separately would not manifest these kinds of patterns.
We have three results. First, even with many names and predicates, appeal to reference
is theoretically dispensable if one is solely concerned with specifying a ﬁnite route to
gain an inﬁnite capacity. Second, there’s a clear sense in which the extra ideology of
reference simpliﬁes the learning task: far fewer pieces of information need be stored on a
subsentential axiomatization. And ﬁnally, one who learned a language via the
subsentential route would have a kind of structured ability that matches patterns
familiar from our own case. The signiﬁcance of this last point will depend on what other
than answering the in-principle learnability question we wish to extract from studying
T-theories—a question we turn to shortly.
There is a point at which the appeal to subsentential semantic properties becomes
(prima facie) ineliminible.8 When quantiﬁers are added to the language, one cannot
even in principle get away with just talking of truth (or even reference and truth, as in
our original theory). To relate the truth-conditions of “something runs” to information
about the predicate “runs”, we need more than just information about how that
predicate combines with names—we need to know whether the predicate applies to
arbitrary things in the domain of discourse (not just those that happen to be named).
One important change that is required is the need for a second subsentential semantic
notion (satisfaction; or, what amounts to the same thing, the relativization of truth to a
variable assignment). But equally, one cannot even in principle derive the
T-biconditionals for all sentences from the T-biconditionals of the atoms.
I note one last characteristic of Davidson’s approach: compared to his rivals, he has only
a limited role for reference. Davidson’s preferred approach assigns referents to names
7Compare (Evans, 1981).
8I’m emphasizing quantiﬁcation here; but see (Evans, 1975) for further considerations about the kinds
of linguistic structure that motivate discerning reference within language (emphasizing in particular
predicate modiﬁcation).
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(and other singular terms—descriptions and demonstratives, for example). He does not
appeal to reference—or indeed any relation between word and ‘semantic value’—for
other linguistic items such as predicates (or connectives or complex expressions such as
sentences). This contrasts with a Fregean approach,9 which might replace (2) in our toy
theory with:
(2*) “runs” refers to the function f such that, for all x, f maps x to the True iﬀ x runs.
If we switch from (2) to (2*), we have to add extra information to tell us about how this
information about the reference of parts of sentences relates to their truth, e.g.:
(5) for N a name, and F a predicate, “N F” is true iﬀ the referent of “N” is mapped by
the referent of “F” to the True.
From a Fregean perspective, the earlier axioms for predicates fuse two separable bits of
information: the semantic signiﬁcance of predicates (their reference), and the semantic
signiﬁcance of concatenation (in this case, function-application). It is a substantive issue
whether or not the technical project of natural language semantics requires such a
disentanglement, or can proceed without it.10
Following Davidson, we’ve been presenting the signiﬁcance of T-theories as an answer to
the question of how a ﬁnite agent can in principle acquire the capacity to understand a
language. But it’s natural to ask the follow-up: how do we manage to pull the trick oﬀ?
Can T-theories illuminate our own case?
The obvious conjecture is this: the way we ourselves understand a language is by having
internalized a T-theory. This involves inter alia, believing the referential axioms, and
standing ready to derive T-biconditionals for arbitrary sentences in the language in
question. On this view, our understanding of language is ultimately constituted by our
beliefs about what words refer to. This does not seem to be Davidson’s view (Lepore &
Ludwig, 2005, pp.119-124)
9As set out e.g. in (Heim & Kratzer, 1998)
10Compare (Heim & Kratzer, 1998; Larson & Segal, 1995). Davidson’s T-theories use a satisfaction
relation on predicates, which requires a compositional axiom to link it to claims about truth. See (Davies,
1987) for dicussion (if one is to do without satisfaction, one must give an alternative semantics for
quantiﬁers—perhaps such as the one (?) attributes to Frege).
The project of general semantics(Lewis, 1970) promised that the semantic signiﬁcance of concatenation
in general, for arbitrary syntactic categories, would be function-application (compare the analysis of
connectives as referring to truth functions, which then operate on the semantic values of sentences—truth
values). This project hit problems, as discussed in the appendices to the collected edition. (Heim &
Kratzer, 1998) show how to cover a large variety of concatenation with just a few kinds of compositional
principles. There seem to be interesting generalizations (and cross-linguistically stable ones) about the
semantic signiﬁcance of concatenation, that would be hidden from view if we packed them into axioms.
Moreover, disentangling composition from lexical axioms in the right way may allow us to articulate
theses about diﬀerent ways in which semantic theory is learned: for example, perhaps our understanding
of concatenation is innate, whereas clearly lexical meaning must be learned.
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It is often suggested that the T-theoretic model illuminates our actual
understanding—that our understanding of language consists of a structured ability, and
the ability to understand a sentence is derived from subabilities systematically associated
the sentences’ components.11 If so, then although the theory appeals to reference, all we
can say in the abstract is that there is some ‘subability’ that plays the same role—and
it’s very much an open question what sort of thing this is.12 The worry with this is that
it abstracts away from the very feature of learning T-theories that gave them their
explanatory power. In deductive reasoning, we have an extant model for how a set of
inference rules, applied to a ﬁnite stock of beliefs, can put us in a position to acquire any
of an inﬁnite stock of beliefs. But it’s not clear what non-doxastic model is available for
putting together a ﬁnite stock of abilities to “derive” some set of “structured abilities”.
Some (even if not Davidson himself) have thought that best version of the Davidsonian
project will involve attributing attitudes to reference to language users as part of
linguistic competence. We look at this view—the strong cognitive conception of
understanding—in §3.2 below.
2 The inscrutability of reference.
In virtue of what do our utterances mean what they do? It is tempting to see a T-theory
as one step towards an answer. What it is for “Asa runs” to be true iﬀ Asa runs, we may
say, is inter alia for “Asa” to refer to Asa, for “runs” to have the appropriate satisfaction
conditions. Having reduced the question of truth to the notions of reference (of names)
and satisfaction conditions (of predicates), we can then look outside language, to get a
ﬁx on what sort of non-semantic facts make it the case that a name refers to a particular
individual, or a predicates is satisﬁed by some object. Some kind of systematic causal
relation between tokenings of the name and states of the world involving the object,
might be appealed to at this point. The general strategy—the building block
approach—reduces truth to reference (et al) and then reference to causation (et al).13
Davidson views the building block approach as misguided. Interestingly, he says that it
would work on condition that a reduction of the reference relation to non-semantic
relations could be performed.14 His case against it rests on pessimism over the
availability of this ﬁnal step. He doesn’t lay out the grounds for his pessimism—as he
says, many have been attracted to the view, and tried to make it work.15 But I think we
should have sympathy for Davidson’s pessimism. The building block theory is based on
a grand promissory note, of reducing to the non-semantic the semantic signiﬁcance of
expressions in all categories. It is hard enough to get a credible theory for names of
medium sized dry goods and their bearers, but a building block metasemantics needs
much more: to account for the reference of singular terms for unobservables, for
11(Davidson, 1967, p.25) says that a success T-theory requires it recover “the structure of a very
complicated ability—the ability to speak and understanding a language”.
12Compare the ‘mirror constraint’ and the discussion of ‘tacit knowledge’ in (Davies, 1981; Wright,
1981; Evans, 1981; Davies, 1987; Miller, 1997).
13A locus classicus is (Field, 1972). The name is introduced in (Davidson, 1977).
14(Davidson, 1977, p.219)
15One inﬂuential programme in the 1980s was the asymmetric dependence causal analysis of (Fodor,
1987).
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abstracta; and beyond singular terms, for determiners, modiﬁers, connectives, and many
other things.
The building block approach to the metaphysics of meaning adopts one familiar
strategy: identiﬁcation of the queried relation (reference) with some relation in the
“reductive base”. Davidson instead aims to provide a characterization of when a
T-theory as a whole (in particular, a set of lexical axioms) is selected by an appropriate
range of non-semantic facts. The account of what this “selection” amounts to we ﬁnd in
Davidson’s discussion of radical interpretation.16 In particular, we ﬁnd the radical
interpreter noting regularities in patterns of assent and dissent, and deriving from these
a set of target T-biconditionals. The selected T-theory is, minimally, one that will
enable one to derive the target T-biconditionals.
From a metaphysical point of view, it is less transparent what is going on here, than in
the case of simple reductive identiﬁcation. Whether the kind of indeterminacy or
inscrutability of reference we’re about to mention is even coherently formulable, depends
on the view of the metaphysics of meaning that it is paired with; I will delay further
discussion until we have inscrutability on the table.
2.1 Twisted T-theories and the grain of data.
As Davidson describes the process, the selection of a T-theory proceeds primarily by
gathering data at the level of the T-biconditionals the selected T-theory must entail.
Thus, on the basis of an observed regularity such as:
Subjects hold-true “Asa runs” iﬀ Asa runs.
The radical interpreter will attempt to ﬁnd T-theories that entail:
“Asa runs” is true iﬀ Asa runs.
There will be many such data-points to account for. Many T-theories can be ruled out
on this basis. For example, one that assigned Beth as the referent of “Asa”, while giving
“runs” its usual interpretation, would entail that “Asa runs” is true iﬀ Beth runs, and
fail to entail the target T-biconditional. On these grounds, the T-theory is knocked out
of the running.
But odd-seeming theories are (seemingly) let through this ﬁlter.17 For example, suppose
that we consider the following T-theory for our toy language (with the standard clauses
for connectives):
16(Davidson, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1980). For a nice comparison and contrast between Field’s building block
approach and the Davidsonian one, see (McDowell, 1978). (Lepore & Ludwig, 2005) contains an excellent,
detailed examination of the prospects and pitfalls of Davidson’s account of radical interpretation.
17See (Davidson, 1979). For other discussions of permutation based arguments for inscrutability, see
(Quine, 1964; Wallace, 1977; Putnam, 1981).
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1*. “Asa” refers to the best friend of Asa.
2*. “N runs” is true iﬀ the referent of N is the best friend of someone who runs.
Given that Beth is Asa’s best friend, the ﬁrst axiom assigns Beth, rather than Asa, as
the individual to whom the name refers. But the second axiom, for runs, makes a
compensating twist, and so, according to theory, we will derive:
“Beth runs” will be true iﬀ the best friend of Asa is the best friend of
someone who runs.
The right hand side of this biconditional is obviously equivalent to the requirement that
Asa runs (at least under the assumption that Asa has a best friend). So it looks like by
twisting the reference scheme, and then compensatingly twisting the interpretation of
predicates, we can derive targetted T-theorems in unexpected ways.
In general, for any set of “target” T-biconditional generated by a “sensible” T-theory q,
and an arbitrary individual b, we can design an alternative T-theory f that both assigns
b as the reference for “Asa” and still allows one to derive the T-biconditionals.
Here’s how to do it. Suppose q says that “Asa” refers to a. Now choose a 1-1 mapping
of individuals onto individuals, f (a “permutation” of the universe), such that f maps a
to b. The chosen function could, for example, map a to b, and b to a, and leave every
other object ﬁxed.
We can then piggyback on q and f to specify the new T-theory f. For each name N in
the language, if q includes an axiom that says that N refers to n, f is to include an
axiom that says that N refers to f (n). If q includes an axiom for predicate P that says
that “N P” is true iﬀ the referent of N is F , then f will include an axiom that says that
“N P” is true iﬀ there is some x such that f (x)=the referent of N, and x is F .
In general, the T-biconditionals derivable in q for atomic sentences will take the form:
“N P” is true iﬀ a is F .
And the corresponding T-biconditionals derivable in f take the form:
“N P” is true iﬀ there exists some x such that f (x) = f (a) and x is F .
The two sentences are obviously equivalent, so the original T-biconditional will be
derivable in the twisted theory (in this case, the equivalence presupposes the “side
information” that f is a function deﬁned for a).
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A particularly dramatic kind of underdetermination of T-theory by data arises.18 The
data doesn’t even eliminate T-theories according to which “Aristotle” refers to a small
furry creature on Alpha Centauri, rather than the ancient Greek philosopher. When
extended to language with demonstratives, the argument implies that the demonstrative
“that”, uttered while you poke your ﬁnger at a ball you are holding up and making
salient, might just as well refers to the Titanic, rather than the poked ball. If ‘selection’
of a T-theory doesn’t impose further constraints, then it appears that either the twisted
theories are selected along with the sensible one, or no T-theories are selected at all.
Davidson appears to embrace the ﬁrst horn of this dilemma. He takes the conclusion to
be that there is simply no fact of the matter which T-theory “gets things right”. And
what we learn from permutation constructions is that reference is utterly indeterminate.
For any x whatsoever, there is no fact of the matter about whether or not “Asa” refers
to x.
2.2 The grain of the data
Do twisted T-theories really generate the data just as well as sensible ones? It is
important to note that the argument is sensitive to exactly what is taken to be required
for a T-theory to ‘generate’ some target T-biconditionals. A very strict understanding of
this relation is possible. To motivate this, note that even in a sensible T-theory, if we
can show:
“Asa runs” is true iﬀ Asa runs
Then if “derivability” is as strong as ﬁrst-order consequence, then equally the following
T-biconditional will be derivable:
“Asa runs” is true iﬀ Asa runs and everything is self-identical.
Intuitively the ﬁrst “gives the meaning” of the sentence mentioned on the left, in the
way the second does not.19 As mentioned earlier, sensible T-theories will generate what
appears to be meaning-specifying biconditionals ‘canonically’—in a way that
step-by-step reﬂects the syntactic build up of the sentence. From sensible axioms the
ﬁrst T-biconditional above is canonically derivable, while the second is not. Its proof
requires some extra steps: proving the relevant tautology and adjoining it to the
biconditional. Valid moves, true, but not ones that have a place in the canonical
derivation.
18Well, at least it does if the above result can be generalized to total theory. As we’ll see below, it’s
worth thinking hard about the details—and paying particular attention to the range of devices involved
in natural languages, which may call for extra tweaks. In the case of intensional semantics, an extremely
general version of permutation inscrutability, for multiplying intensional type theory, is given in (Williams,
2008b).
19See (Foster, 1976; Davidson, 1976)
9
Davidson on reference J. Robert G. Williams
What happens if in radical interpretation we require target T-sentences to be
canonically generated from the T-theory?20 What is canonically derivable from the
twisted theories described earlier are T-biconditionals such as:
“Asa runs” is true iﬀ Asa’s best friend is the best friend of someone who runs.
Or, for permutation f :
“Asa runs” is true iﬀ there is an x, such that f (x) = f (Asa), and x runs.
So the twisted theories simply fail the test of allowing the canonical derivation of the
following target T-biconditional:
‘Asa runs’ is true iﬀ Asa runs.
What the twisted T-theories canonically generate are biconditionals obviously equivalent
to the targetted one. But that cuts no ice if canonically derivability is really the
criterion they are to be judged by.
Does this mean that we don’t need to worry about the inscrutability of reference in a
Davidsonian theory, then? That would be far too quick. For the move to canonical
derivability essentially ﬁne-grains the data to which we are helping ourselves (the target
T-biconditionals). The radical interpreter might ﬁnd it comparatively easy to shift from
a set of T-biconditionals to a T-theory, but how is she to get a ﬁx on the
T-biconditionals themselves, on the basis of the kind of hold-true data we are
supposing? Thus, suppose it’s a regularity that:
Speakers hold-true “Asa runs” iﬀ Asa runs.
The following will also be a regularity:
Speakers hold-true “Asa runs” iﬀ there is an x, such that f(Asa)=f(x), and x
runs.
So which regularity should the radical interpreter take as her guide to picking a target
T-biconditional? If the former, then the sensible interpretation of the language will be
(determinately) selected. If the latter, then the twisted interpretation will be
(determinately) selected. There is still, prima facie, just as much indeterminacy in the
process of selecting a T-theory. It simply enters at an earlier stage.
20See(Williams, 2008a).
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Theorists of radical interpretation (if not Davidson himself) could try to block the
argument for radical inscrutability by putting pressure at this point. For example,
perhaps not all regularities are created equal. Some regularities may be lawlike, others
not. and perhaps only lawlike regularities should be data the radical interpreter uses to
form target T-sentences.21 For this to be relevant to the current case, one would have to
argue that our ﬁrst regularity is lawlike, and the second (permutation-involving)
regularity is not. There are a few options to explore here. Even if the two regularities
are conceded to be necessarily equivalent, it might be that lawlikeness is
hyperintentional: only the simple formulations count as laws. Or one could question
lawlikeness by pointing to issues with their alleged equivalence. For example, suppose
that f (Asa)=Beth. Now consider a situation in which Asa exists but Beth does not.
Relative to that situation, the condition laid down in the right hand side of the ‘twisted’
T-biconditional is false, though that laid down in the original is true.22
2.3 Simplicity.
We’ve seen one reason for thinking that radical inscrutability of reference does not
follow even from Davidson’s very liberal constraints on theory-selection. To exploit this
line in defending the determinacy of reference would require an ultra-ﬁne-grained story
about the target data for radical interpretation.
The other way of blocking inscrutability appeals, not to ﬁne-grained data, but to
theoretical constraints the radical interpreter uses to pick a T-theory on the basis of
that data. We might argue, for example, that among the various theories that would
generate the right T-biconditionals (or something obviously equivalent to the right
T-biconditionals) the radical interpreter should believe the simplest. This seems not at
all ad hoc, but simply an application of usual canons of theory choice to the particular
situation the radical interpreter faces.
Simplicity, it might be said, will favour sensible axioms such as
1. “Asa” refers to Asa
2. “N runs” is true iﬀ the referent of N runs
over their twisted, and slightly more complex, counterparts:
21Compare Davidson’s appeal to lawlike regularites in (Davidson, 1984, introduction).
22Compare (McGee, 2005; Williams, 2008b). Why then did I say earlier they seem ‘obviously’ equiv-
alent? Well, they are equivalent under the ‘side constraint’ that f is a well-deﬁned function. In any
counterfactual scenario in which f maps Asa to anything, the two conditions are equivalent. Moreover,
just as one can arguably know a priori the (contingent) truth that the standard metre is a metre; one
can arguably know a priori the (contingent) truth that f is a function that maps Asa to Beth. So the
two conditions may be a priori, though only contingently, equivalent.
Note that we would be unable to rule out on these grounds twisted T-theories that map Asa to Asa’s
singleton, or to necessary existents like numbers. So arguably the strategy does not go to the heart of
the problem.
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1*. “Asa” refers to f(Asa).
2*. “N runs” is true iﬀ there is an x, such that f(the referent of N)=f(x), and x runs.
So the sensible theory will rank as a better theory accounting for the relevant data,
when compared to its twisted rivals.
This is the kind of thing that David Lewis once advocated as a response to “Quinean”
worries about indeterminacy within an interpretationist metasemantics.23 And he added
a useful caveat: facts about reference, he said, would on this account be “no more
objective” than our canons of simplicity. One can appreciate the concern: simplicity
might very well be understood in ethnocentric terms—as what people like us ﬁnd
simple, or tractable, or useable.24 But if that’s the case, then it seems that even if
indeterminacy is avoided, a relativity to our practical concerns or limitations is not.
One way in which simplicity might be relative, is that its evaluation may be sensitive to
the language the interpreter happens to use. Suppose, for example, that we introduce a
descriptive name for f(Asa)—Fasa, say. And suppose that we introduce a primitive
predicate “fruns” synonymous with “y such that there is an x, such that f(y)=f(x), and
x runs”.25 Then we could replace (1*) and (2*) above with:
1**. “Asa” refers to Fasa.
2**. “N runs” is true iﬀ the referent of N fruns.
Now from a syntactical point of view, this new theory exactly parallels the original,
sensible one. To the extent that we are using syntactic economy as a stalking horse for
whatever criterion of theoretical simplicity we will ultimately appeal to, then (at least
for radical interpreters with the enriched metalanguage) there is no discriminating
between sensible and twisted T-theories on these grounds.
One reaction is to say that there is a privileged metalanguage in which to assess
simplicity. This is the root, as I see it, of David Lewis’s appeal to eligibility as a
constraint on radical interpretation.26 In essence, Lewis picks a canonical metalanguage
(the language of “Ontolegese”, where primitive predicates stand for metaphysically
fundamental properties) and constrains interpreters to pick theories that (all else equal)
are simplest when formulated in it. Davidsonians impatient with the Lewisian
metaphysics (or even those happy with the metaphysics, but disliking its invocation as a
way of “objectivizing” the notion of simplicity) might still be able to use the general
idea if they can by some other means identify a privileged metalanguage from which to
assess simplicity/complexity.
23(Lewis, 1975). For more on Lewis’ version of radical interpretation, see (Lewis, 1969, 1974, 1984,
1992).
24Compare the detailed discussion of the appeals to theoretical virtues in generative linguistics in
(Ludlow, 2011).
25Compare the trouble for Humean theories of laws described in (Lewis, 1983)
26(Lewis, 1983, 1984, 1992). I discuss and defend this reading in (Williams, 2007, ms.)
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2.4 The formulation of inscrutability: relativizations
Suppose, pro tem, that total inscrutability of reference does follow from Davidson’s
overall position. In the next section, we will look at Davidson’s thesis of the
unexplanatoriness of reference, which might help to draw the sting from the initially
counterintuitive thesis being put forward. But a preliminary question is how this thesis
should even be formulated.
The threat of inscrutability arises because multiple theory are ‘selected’ by the radical
interpretation procedure. But on the face of it we can’t consistently endorse all of
them—they say incompatible things! But that leaves us with a puzzle. If we’re to use
one of the T-theories in interpreting one another, aren’t we committed to thinking it
gets things right—but thinking it’s right, and hence the incompatible coselected
T-theories are wrong, seems exactly what the thesis of the inscrutability of reference was
trying to avoid commitment to.
One option is to deny that the T-theories that are ‘selected’ are inconsistent.
Relativizing the semantic predicates they involve is an obvious way to achieve this.
There is no contradiction in saying that “Ada” refers1 to Ada and not f(Ada); but
refers2 to f(Ada) rather than Ada. Davidson in fact endorses a version of this proposal.
Semantic properties on his treatment are already relativized to a language, as well as a
speaker and a time (the existence of homologues and homophones across diﬀerent
languages makes this necessary: ‘gift’ applies to poisons in Scandanavian languages, but
applies to very diﬀerent things in English). Drawing on this, Davidson suggests that
rather than two candidate reference relations for a single language, we have two
languages, each with a single candidate reference relation. You might have thought
“English” (or “my idiolect of English”) named a single language. For Davidson, it picks
out an inﬁnite cluster of languages, one for each precisiﬁcation of the reference scheme.27
The idea is striking. But it’s unclear whether it answers the problem. What makes the
word “Ada” in one such L, relate to Ada rather than fAda?28 Not the empirical factors
that feed into radical interpretation, ex hypothesi29—but then what are these mysterious
‘non-empirical’ factors that complete the job?30 Indeed, the very supervenience of
word-meaning on non-semantic facts, that Davidson took as initial motivation for his
project, appears to be being denied—since the relevant non-semantic facts are the same
for each of the “languages” being posited, and yet the reference relations diﬀer.
Davidson’s approach to relativization is to give an informative account of what the
relativization is to—in this case, a language. Relativity to language and to context
27See (Davidson, 1979, p.239).
28Davidson says “all that we can say gets ﬁxed relativization is the way that we answer questions about
reference, not reference itself”. I don’t understand this qualiﬁcation, but it seems relevant to the challenge
being put forward here.
29“it is not entirely an empirical question which language a person speaks” (Davidson, 1979, p.240)
30Davidson appears to think that ‘the language that P speak’ fails to pick out a unique language, but
we can describe one among the cluster by specifying which T -theory we are using. But we if picked out
the L to which we relativize as the one spoken by population P and characterized by T-theory q, then the
claim that q is the right T -theory for L will become tautologous, and the empirical constraints of radical
interpretation utterly rundundent. What we want is a sense of how the work factorizes, into an emprical
component provided by radical intepretation, and some non-empirical component somehow built into the
languages themselves.
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(speaker and time) are precedents for this approach. The other relativization strategies
he considers (and rejects) share this characteristic. But there are other models for
relativization within semantics. In quantiﬁcation theory, we relativize semantic
properties (satisfaction, in particular) to a sequence of objects. The relativization
“disappears” at the level at which the theory makes contact with data—we say that S is
true simpliciter just in case S is satisﬁed relative to every sequence.
We could relativize reference and predicate-satisfaction to arbitrary indices. Our
metasemantics will say that every individually empirically adequate T-scheme should be
assigned an index in this super-T-theory. We can then derive relativized
T-biconditionals, and our rule will again be that a sentence is true simpliciter iﬀ it is
true on every index. If it is possible to derive that S is true-i iﬀ p, for all i, then by the
deﬁnition of truth simpliciter, we will be able to derive the unrelativized T-biconditional
that S is true iﬀ p. For the case of permutation inscrutability, where the truth
conditions of whole sentences are (with the caveats noted earlier about ﬁne-graining
derivability) held ﬁxed, then the relativization makes no diﬀerence at the level of whole
sentences. In other cases of indeterminacy of interpretation, sentences might (in given
conditions) come out true on one adequate interpretation, and false on another. The
kind of approach just sketched (a broadly “supervaluational” one), predicts in this case
they are neither true nor false.31
The abstract relativization move is worth considering, if only for its popularity
elsewhere in philosophy. To mention one immediate worry: it’s not obvious that it
resolves the problem of “too many adequate theories”—if anything, it worsens it, by
adding yet another seemingly adequate theory, generating the target T-sentences, to the
mix. Does it have virtues the original cluster lacked? It certainly is less committal, not
making any deﬁnitive predictions about what refers to what. Perhaps a theorist should
favour theories, all else equal, that are cautious in this way.
Davidson’s frequent invocation of instrumentalism suggests a third response, rather
diﬀerent from his oﬃcial relativization strategy. The characteristic move of the
instrumentalist about theory T is to shift attention from whether T is true (or whether
we believe it) to whether T is useful (and what we can use it to do). In the context of
T-theories, rather than asking in the ﬁrst instance about whether “Ada” refers to Ada,
we might instead ask: under what conditions is it ok to use a T-theory q that says that
“Ada” refers to Ada, in interpreting a speaker? Here are two possible answers:
(a) The use of q is ok so long as q ﬁts the relevant data in the way described in radical
interpretation.
(b) The use of q is ok so long as (inter alia) “Ada” refers to Ada.
31For supervaluations, see (Fine, 1975; Keefe, 2000). Another way a Davidsonian could get this eﬀect
is by endorsing disjunctions of T-theories. If q and f are selected T-theories, then one could endorse
q_ f, and use reasoning by cases to derive the common consequences of each theory. Notice, however,
that the derivations would not have the usual canonical form (requirement two such derivations under
suppositions, plus the disjunction-discharge step). Moreover, only disjunctions of whole theories would
work—disjoining the lexical atoms individually would not have the same power, since one loses the
‘penumbral connections’ between twisted reference schemes and twisted predicate axioms that is vital to
pulling oﬀ the trick.
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Someone who endorses (b) commits themselves to the view that T-theories used in
interpretation must get the semantic facts right. Endorsing (a) does not have this
commitment. For all (a) says, a T-theory I use to interpret you could be false, or
meaningless—the question of q’s status simply does not arise if (a) alone is the criterion.
The advocate of (a) will insist that there is no direct inconsistency between the view it
is permissible to use q in interpretating a speaker, and also permissible to use f for the
same task—even if q and f themselves are mutually contradictory. Two ﬁctional tales
can be equally good at helping a child to sleep—they don’t have to be mutually
consistent to play that role.
Of course, giving answer (a) cannot prevent us from asking the question whether a
particular theory q is in fact true. And it looks like (for the reasons set out above) that
unless we somehow adjust what the T-theories say (by a relativization strategy, for
example), then (b) tells us straight oﬀ that it cannot be that q and f are both
permissible interpretative strategies. If mutually incompatible theories both “ﬁt” the
radical interpreters data, therefore, then (a) and (b) contradict each other. (a) will tell
us that the theories are all ok to use in interpretation. (b) tells us that at least one of
these theories is not ok to use in interpretation. One reaction would be to hold (b) ﬁxed,
and consider this a problem for those Davidsonians who would endorse (a). But a
legitimate and interesting reaction for the Davidsonian, it seems to me, is to hold onto
(a), and dismiss (b).
This kind of view has genuine instrumentalist precedent. Consider the following
formulation the position on the use of a mathematics in science in (Field, 1980, 1989).
Field’s position is that it is acceptable to use mathematics in science so long as the
mathematized science is conservative over true, nominalized science. But he rejects that
permissible use requires the mathematized scientiﬁc theory itself be true (“Mathematics
doesn’t have to be true to be good”). Field’s own original view is that we should in fact
disbelieve existentially committing parts of mathematics. But the core of his view is
that the issue of the truth of mathematics is irrelevant to its applicability. Note that
analogues to the situation of incompatible T-theories can well arise. Two incompatible
set theories, each conservative over nominalistic science, might equally well serve the
purposes of formulating an instrumentally useful mathematized science.
Davidson explicitly endorses both the relativization strategy, and the analogy to
instrumentalism. In the terms just sketched, we can view this as him endorsing (a), and
thinking of this as suﬃcient to account for the utility of T-theories; but then rather
than rejecting (b) (as an error-theorist like Field advocates) he attempts to hold onto it
by trying to make the T-theories compatible via relativization. Rather than pursue
relativization, perhaps he would have been better giving up on (b) altogether, and
simply insist that semantics does not have to be true to be good.
3 Explanations and reference.
Suppose Ada raises her arm. This may (in context) be explained by pointing to the
beliefs and desires that Ada has—that she wanted to be excused, and believed that the
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best way to do this was by attracting attention by raising his arm. Beliefs, and desires,
prima facie, have a wide explanatory role—they explain a wide variety of events in the
outside world. Plausibly, they immediately explain actions, and mediately, via the
actions, many other events are brought about. Presumably, an agents’ beliefs are also
involved in immediate explanations of various other aspects of her psychology (for
example, emotional states) which themselves go on to have behavioural and worldly
consequences.
It is less clear that semantic properties of sentence (truth, reference, and the rest)
feature in such immediate explanations of worldly happenings. If they do, the most
likely candidate explananda would be to do with communication. The fact that I
uttered “Ada runs” may be explained by the truth of that sentence (given the fact that
I’m a reliable detector of the truth of such sentences, a truthful interlocutor, etc). And
the fact someone formed the belief that Ada runs may be explained by the fact that the
truth conditions for “Ada runs” are that Ada runs, plus the fact she heard me utter
those words, trusts me as informant, etc. A ﬁrst question for anyone thinking about the
explanatory role of semantic properties concerns the breadth of that role—the varieties
and kinds of events that are (in part) immediately explained by citing semantic
properties.
Say that a property P is involved in an explanation directly if one of the things that
explains the event in question is something’s having P. Say that it is involved merely
indirectly if one of the things that explains the event is an agent’s believing something
has P. It is not obvious that we need to invoke semantic properties directly in linguistic
explanations at all. Prima facie, my uttering “Ada runs” is just as well explained by the
fact that I believe the sentence true (plus my sincerity) as it is by the fact that they are
true (plus my truthfulness). A second question for anyone thinking about the
explanatory role of semantic properties is whether the role is direct or indirect.
The third question—and our focus here—is whether there’s diﬀerence on either
dimension between the explanatory role of sentential semantic properties like truth, and
the explanatory role of subsentential reference.
3.1 Reference-invoking explanations.
Let’s make the assumption that the only happenings immediately explained by semantic
properties involve speech acts—either on the producer or consumer side (uttering a true
sentence; or forming a true belief). We assert by uttering a sentence with assertoric force
(“the door is shut’’), question by uttering a sentence with interrogative force (“is the
door shut?’’), command by uttering a sentence with imperatival force (“shut the door’’).
In each case, you might well think we should cite the truth-conditions of the sentence in
explaining why the speaker uttered the sentence or why their audience reacted as they
did. Thus: Ada utters “the door is shut” inter alia because she wished to convey
whether the door was shut, and “the door is shut” means that the door is shut.
Is reference involved in such explanations? Prima facie it is involved mediately—facts
about reference explain facts about truth-conditions, which in turn explain other things.
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On the assumption that the only locus for semantic explanations involve speech acts,
and the only relevant speech acts are sentential, then (strangely) reference-involving
explanations will always pass through a bottleneck: they only explain anything at all via
grounding truth-conditional properties. Reference would be extraordinarily narrow in
explanatory power—immediately explaining only the obtaining of other semantic
properties.
Davidson’s radical intepretation allows him to add a distinctive twist. After all, here we
have T -sentences as the basic data, and the success of a T -theory is tested by how well it
matches them. Does this mean that truth conditions explain reference, rather than vice
versa? That might make reference utterly explanatorily idle. But Davidson’s does not
straightforwardly endorse this. He distinguishes ‘the order of explanation that is
appropriate once the theory is in place’ from ‘the explanation of why the theory is
correct’. 32 In the second sense, truth has priority over reference, for the
interpretationist. But that still leaves another sense of explanation in which reference
explains truth. But what is this sense? To be sure, when learning a language, perhaps
one proceeds from conjectures about truth conditions, to establishing a theory invoking
reference, and then (later, with the theory in place) to derive novel predictions about
truth. One has those ﬁnal beliefs about truth only because of the beliefs about reference
possessed at the intermediate phase. But here we have beliefs explaining beliefs; not
reference explaining truth.
Davidson (1990, p.300) claims there is an exact analogy between appeal to reference in
semantics, and appeal to unobservables in physical explanations. So perhaps his answer
to the above would be to claim that reference explains truth in a sense of ‘explanation’
utterly familiar from the physical sciences. But pace Davidson, there are real diﬀerences
between the cases. Posit atoms for one explanatory purpose (reducing thermodynamics)
and one can generate new surprising predictions in a quite diﬀerent area (brownian
motion). Davidson says “there can be no question about the use of these theoretical
concepts [reference and satisfaction] beyond the question of whether they yield a
satisfactory account of the use of sentences” (ibid). But, I think, one should not say that
“there can be no question of the use of concepts of atomic particles, beyond the question
of whether they yield a satisfactory account of thermodynamic properties”. Physical
posits break free of the particular theories for which they are originally introduced. It’s
really not obvious whether reference does so, and this puts pressure on the claim that it
is explanatory of truth-conditions in any strict sense.
A bottlenecked (at best) explanatory role for reference has consequences for our
assessment of the tenability of radical inscrutability of reference. After all, why are
revisionary philosophical theories to be regarded with suspicion in the ﬁrst place? Not
simply because they require us to change our beliefs (we might welcome the shock of the
new). We are and should be wary of them because we want assurance that the revisions
being proposed won’t wreak havoc on our wider theory of the world—that the baby isn’t
being thrown away with the bathwater. A conﬁned revisionism, where we have an
assurance that we can change our views on one subject matter while keeping views on
other subject matters untouched, would be far less worrying. If reference truly does have
32(Davidson, 1990, p.300). In earlier writings, e.g. throughout (Davidson, 1984/1970), Davidson is
happy to talk of explaining the truth-conditions of sentences.
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(at best) the extraordinarily narrow explanatorily role outlined above, then it looks like
we’re in this position. What we think about reference is a “don’t care” issue so far as
total theory is concerned, so long as the appropriate truth-conditions are generated.
And, of course, the twisted reference schemes that generate the inscrutability of
reference do all agree (more or less) at the level of truth-conditions of whole sentences.
It is interesting that Field (1975)—even in a phase where he was an explicit advocate of
the building block metaphysics of meaning that Davidson deprecated—explicitly
endorsed the narrow, bottlenecked conception of the explanatory role of reference. He
distanced himself from what he saw as Davidson’s instrumentalism. But he did think
that facts about reference were conventional, in the sense that there was no deep
rationale for our focusing on the reference relation we do (which Field took to match up
with certain causal relations) rather than some permuted variant of it. Someone who
worked with what Field regarded as a determinately diﬀerent subsentential semantic
relation arising from a permutation of the original, would be able to explain all that
needs to be explained equally well. He compared our focus on reference over its twisted
cousins as comparable to the convention of driving on the right side of the road. It gets
the job done—perhaps in a rather elegant way—but it’s not the only way to do it.
An absent, or bottlenecked explanatory role for reference would make the inscrutability
of reference liveable-with. But we should subject the starting points to scrutiny. Can
semantic properties explain things other than speech acts? And must a putative
explanatory role for reference in communication always go via truth-conditions?
Fragmentary speech acts (discussed further below) might provide cases where we
reference has an immediate explanatory role.
3.2 Explanations involving beliefs about reference?
Even the bottlenecked explanatory role for reference presupposed that truth or
truth-conditions have direct explanatory work to do. But it is not obvious that the kind
of explanatory contexts that have been discussed—communicative ones—require direct
appeal to facts about truth or truth-conditions as opposed to opinions on the part of
speakers and audience on the matter. Perhaps the role of semantics in explanations is
always ‘indirect’ in this sense. Even if this is not the case, the explanatory proﬁles of
reference vs truth, and beliefs about reference vs. beliefs about truth, may diﬀer. Even
if reference itself is explanatorily idle, in at least some cases there’s a strong case that
one believes about reference, explains what one believes about truth-conditions of whole
sentences. Second language learning is a case in point. Some go further, and say that
ﬁrst-language linguistic competence is constituted, in part, by (perhaps knowledgable)
beliefs about reference.33
The role of beliefs about reference in linguistic competence is of independent interest.
And it is particular relevant to Davidson’s project, since it makes a diﬀerence to the
tenability of the inscrutability theses he endorses. If one believes p, and there’s no fact
of the matter about p, there’s no fact of the matter about whether one’s belief is
33Compare the slogan that understanding is knowing the meaning of one’s words. Pettit (2002) contains
an interesting discussion about whether knowledge is appropriate here.
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correct. The fully informed and reﬂective will know this full well. It seems an
uncomfortable—even Moore-paradoxical—state to be in.34 But if beliefs about reference
are constitutive of linguistic competence, and reference is inscrutable, then competence
itself commits us to this uncomfortable situation.
Call the view that person-level beliefs about semantic properties are (in part)
constitutive of competence the cognitive view of understanding. Cognitive views come in
various strengths. A weak cognitive view says that only beliefs about the
truth-conditions of sentences are required for linguistic understanding.35 A strong view
says that beliefs about the reference of names are required for understanding. The
strong version needn’t be ultra-strong; it needn’t attribute knowledge of an entire
semantic theory, or every axiom within it (which would be phenomenologically very
implausible, if we’re talking about person-level, consciously-accessible beliefs).
One case for a cognitive view of (ﬁrst-language) competence is based on the verbal
rationality of linguistic acts.36 I utter ‘Ada runs’. My action is an intentional one, not
something that just ‘happens to me’. Characteristically, then, we should expect practical
reasoning explanations to be available, showing how my beliefs and desires interact so as
to make the action ‘the thing to do’. A natural suggestion is that this involves a wish to
communicate that Ada runs, the belief I can communicate this by uttering something
that means that Ada runs, plus the belief that ‘Ada runs’ means that Ada runs. A nice
aspect of this story is that it can show why certain inappropriate speech acts are
nevertheless rationally performed—I might say that ‘Asa runs’ when wanting to convey
Ada runs, mistakenly believing that ‘Asa runs’ means that Ada runs. The action would
be rationalized as normal, and we can pinpointed the faulty belief which makes it misﬁre.
Suppose we accept that person-level beliefs about truth-conditions are involved in
ﬁrst-person competence.37 This doesn’t immediately take us to a strong cognitive
conception. To be sure, if one systematically believes the right things about the
truth-conditions of sentences, this must be explained. But the mechanism providing the
explanation might be causal, rather than person-level and inferential.38
34In fact, the issues here run deep, since it turns on what rational constraints believing p to be inde-
terminate place on one’s attitudes to p. See (Williams, forthcoming) and the references therein.
35Such a view is proposed in Wright (1987). It’s worth considering whether Davidson held a version
of the weak theory. at (Davidson, 1974, p.142), he writes that any competent interpreter “a speciﬁable
inﬁnite subset of the truths of the theory”, and seems to have in mind the T-theorems that connect most
directly to patterns of usage. For a diﬀerent reading of the passages, see (?, p.122)
36What follows is heavily inﬂuenced by the excellent (Heck, 2006). For deployment of this kind of
consideration against Davidson, see especially (Rumﬁtt, 1995, §XI). Hornsby (2005) argues for a model
of linguistic rationality that does not taken the form sketched below.
37Incidentally, one issue here is whether ‘competence’ is the right word to use, or whether we should
really be thinking of this as a higher achievement—mastery of the language. Perhaps young children are
competent with a language, in virtue of simple immersion, without their linguistic actions being fully
verbally rational.
38For discussion, see Wright (1981); Evans (1981); Davies (1981) and Miller (1997). As an example of
the ‘subpersonal’ strategy, consider the conjecture that human psychology involves a semantic module—a
representation of semantic axioms of a T-theory, formulated in the ‘language of thought’, as discussed
in (Larson & Segal, 1995). The module stands ready to process the canonical derivations, to output T-
biconditionals (perhaps into consciouslly-accessible beliefs) for any given sentence. The representations
of reference relations would not deserve the name ‘beliefs’ (as part of a mental module, they would be
unavailable for general processing, and we would not have person-level introspective access to them).
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It’s not clear that the weak cognitive conception just sketched is stable. Consider again
the patterns in our understanding of sentences. If I mistakenly think that ‘Ada runs’
means that Asa runs, I’ll also think that ‘Ada sits’ means that Asa sits. But consider
someone who didn’t operate this way: who conﬁdently believed the ﬁrst while retaining
the belief that ‘Ada Gs’ is true if and only Ada Gs for all other G. The weak cognitive
conception would depict this as a mere processing error, and think there need be no
rational criticism of the linguistic beliefs that constitute understanding. Consider also
dictionary-learning of new words. A strong cognitive view of understanding has a
straightforward account: one learns new facts about what words refer to, or what
predicates are true of, which are directly relevant to one’s understanding. The weak
cognitive view depicts the process as strangely indirect: involving a post-hoc
management of the subpersonal capacities that dispose one to acquire person-level
beliefs about truth conditions.
If there are (verbally rational) subsentential speech acts, then the motivation for a
strong cognitive conception may transfer directly. Stainton (1998) gives an example
from which the following is adapted. We are at a round-table meeting, and I am
describing seating arrangements. I do so by pointing at various chairs, while uttering,
successively, “the boss”, “anyone who needs to go early”, “a representative from the
faculty board”, “Ada”. The audience forms appropriate beliefs. Clearly I have managed
to communicate propositional contents, but I have done so by uttering fragments of
sentences. The motivations at this point for a strong cognitive conception can parallel
those for the weak one. This sort of language use looks verbally rational. To secure
verbal rationality, we need semantic beliefs to play a role in the practical reasoning
explanation of the speech act. Suppose that I wrongly believe that the chairperson is
called ‘Ada’. My pointing to the chair and uttering “Ada” is a rational act, with a
practical reasoning explanation routing through the (mistaken) belief that:
‘Ada’ refers to the Chairperson.
This argument turns crucially on the principle that my utterances are truly
subsentential speech acts. There is an alternative diagnosis: even though a fragment is
all that is phonetically realized, it may be that a sentence is uttered. The obvious
parallel is to ellipsis. For example the material in square brackets in the following might
not be pronounced:
Ada was walking and Jean was [walking] too.
The ellipsis hypothesis (Stainton, 1998) is that the kind of speech acts we have been
considering are elliptical for full sentences, and are syntactically sentential, that what is
uttered is:
‘Ada [sits here]’
Only a sentential semantic beliefs would be required to account for the verbal rationality
20
Davidson on reference J. Robert G. Williams
of the speech act. Whether the ellipsis hypothesis is correct is a contested, empirical
question.39
A strong cognitive view of understanding, as mentioned, seems prima facie in tension
with the view that reference is radically indeterminate. It’s worth recalling, however,
that Davidson’s own articulation of the inscrutability of reference was rather nuanced:
he did think there were correct things to think about appropriately relativized reference
relations, and perhaps belief in these could subserve the verbal rationality of language
use. I earlier suggested that he might have been better oﬀ embracing a more
full-blooded instrumentalism.40
Such a position, on the face of it, would be in severe tension with cognitive views of
understanding—linguistic competence would commit one to a range of semantic beliefs,
to which the informed and reﬂective would on the contrary advocate an instrumentalist
(perhaps error-theoretic) attitude. How could we square this circle? Perhaps the
instrumentalist could appeal to some surrogate attitude: as-if belief or pretence rather
than belief as the appropriate cognitive attitude to take to T-theories. Whether appeal
to pretence can really provide practical reasoning explanations is another matter—a
wish for a cup of tea; plus the pretence that the liquid in the toy cup is tea, does not
rationalize taking a sip.
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